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Abstract 
This paper addresses fundamental issues 
on the nature of the concepts and structures 
of fuzzy logic, focusing, in particular, on the 
conceptual and functional differences that 
exist between probabilistic and possibilistic 
approaches. 
A semantic model provides the basic 
framework to define possibilistic structures 
and concepts by means of a function that 
quantifies proximity, closeness, or resem­
blance between pairs of possible worlds. The 
resulting model is a natural extension, based 
on multiple conceivability relations, of the 
modal logic concepts of necessity and possi­
bility. By contrast, chance-oriented proba­
bilistic concepts and structures rely on mea-
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the Department of the Army, or the United States 
Government. 
sures of set extension that quantify the pro­
portion of possible worlds where a proposi­
tion is true. 
Resemblance between possible worlds is 
quantified by a generalized similarity rela­
tion, i.e., a function that assigns a number 
between 0 and 1 to every pair of possible 
worlds. Using this similarity relation, which 
is a form of numerical complement of a clas­
sic metric or distance, it is possible to de­
fine and interpret the major constructs and 
methods of fuzzy logic: conditional and un­
conditional possibility and necessity distri­
butions and the generalized modus ponens 
of Zadeh. 
1 Introduction 
In this paper, we present a semantic model of 
the major concepts, structures, and methods 
of fuzzy or possibilistic [13,14] logic. This 
model is based on a framework that com­
bines the notion of a possible world [1], i.e., 
a potential state or situation of a real-world 
system, with measures of proximity or re­
semblance between pairs of possible worlds. 
The resulting structures are substantially 
different in character from those of proba­
bilistic reasoning, based on measures of set 
extension, that quantify the proportion of 
possible worlds where a given proposition is 
true. 
The results reported in this paper are 
the latest in a continuing investigative ef­
fort aimed at clarifying basic conceptual sim­
ilarities and differences between a number 
of approaches to the treatment of impreci­
sion and uncertainty. Using also possible­
world semantic models, prior research has 
established that the Dempster-Shafer calcu­
lus of evidence may be interpreted by struc­
tures that result from the combination of 
conventional probabilistic calculus with epis­
temic logics [7). By contrast, the formal 
structures discussed herein clearly show that 
fuzzy logic may be understood in a straight­
forward fashion by using conventional metric 
notions in a space of possible worlds with­
out resorting in any form to probabilistic 
concepts. Furthermore, the actual functions 
that are used to combine possibilistic knowl­
edge are substantially different from those 
used in the probability calculus. 
Our exposition, which will be limited to 
the major structures of fuzzy logic, defines 
possibilistic concepts by using a more prim­
ive notion that has been found to be an es­
sential component of important human cog­
nitive processes (11). The notion of similar­
ity, in spite of its importance in reasoning 
processes, has not received substantial atten­
tion in treatments based on the use of logical 
concepts. 
Perhaps as a consequence of its reliance on 
methods for the manipulation of symbolic 
strings and on a single partial order rela­
tion (implication) between formulas as the 
basis for its derivation procedures, there has 
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been little attention given in formal logic to 
the consideration of other formal structures 
that capture important features of human 
knowledge such as the resemblance that ex­
ists between situations or circumstances. Al­
though, for example, stating that the tem­
perature is 28°C as opposed to saying that 
it is 29°C may be rather inconsequential in 
terms of the implication of either statement 
to a decision-maker (e.g., trying to decide 
what to wear), there is nothing in the ba­
sic framework of logic that makes the sec­
ond statement any more different than to 
say that the temperature is below freezing 
(as neither of the three statements is logi­
cally consistent with the other two). 
The determination and use of similarity 
information is, however, not only central to 
all forms of analogical reasoning but it is an 
essential element in the derivation of physi­
cal law. Formal studies in measurement the­
ory [6) clearly show the role that measures 
based on similar behavior play in the deriva­
tion of rational measurement schemes, while 
also explaining the ubiquitous presence of 
numeric scales throughout science. 
The results presented in this paper show 
that, when such notions of proximity are for­
malized in the context of a possible-worlds 
model, the major functional structures of 
fuzzy logic, possibility and necessity distri­
butions, and its major inferential procedure, 
the generalized modus ponens of Zadeh, may 
be readily explained as a natural extension 
of classical logical concepts. In particular, 
possibility and necessity distributions sim­
ply correspond to best and worst scenarios 
in a space of possible real-world states, while 
the generalized modus ponens [14] is a sound 
inferential procedure that may be regarded 
as a form of logical extrapolation between 
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neighboring situations. 
The scope of this paper prevents a de­
tailed discussion of all pertinent results and 
derivations. A complete account of all rele­
vant matters regarding this similarity-based 
model of fuzzy logic is presented in a related 
technical note [8], which this paper summa­
nzes. 
2 The Approximate Reasoning 
Problem 
Our model of the approximate reasoning 
problem is based on the notion of "possible 
world." Informally, possible worlds are the 
conceivable states of affairs of a real-world 
system that are consistent with the laws of 
logic. 
Restricting ourselves, for the sake of sim­
plicity to propositional formulations, a pos­
sible world is a function [1] that assigns a 
unique conventional truth value (i.e., true 
or false) to every proposition that describes 
some relevant aspect of the state of a real­
world system and that, in addition, satisfies 
the axioms of propositional logic. 
In the absence of any knowledge about the 
behavior of a system of interest or of any ob­
servation about its state, it is impossible to 
determine which, among all conceivable sit­
uations, corresponds to the actual state of 
the real world. Availability of factual ev­
idence or determination of the laws of be­
havior of the system permits us, however, to 
eliminate from consideration some possible 
worlds in this universe of discourse. The re­
maining possible worlds correspond to satis­
fiable propositions that, in addition, are logi­
cally consistent with the evidence. This sub­
set of conceivable situations or scenarios will 
be called the evidential set, denoted S'. 
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If the typical reasoning problem is thought 
of as the determination of the truth value 
of a proposition h (the hypothesis), then an 
approximate reasoning problem may be de­
scribed as one where available evidence does 
not permit such evaluation without ambigu­
ity. In other words, as illustrated in Figure 1, 
there are some members of the evidential set 
where the hypothesis is true and some where 
it is false. 
HYPOTHESIS TRUE HYPOTHESIS FALSE 
Figure 1: The approximate reasoning prob­
lem 
Our approach to the formalization of the 
major concepts and structures of fuzzy logic 
is based on a generalization of a central 
concept of semantic models of modal log­
ics. Modal logics [3] may be generally de­
scribed as extensions of conventional two­
valued logic that permit us to qualify, in 
various ways, the meaning of propositional 
truth. 
In our model, we utilize modal concepts 
to explain basic possibilistic structures using 
the more primitive notion of similarity. This 
notion is introduced, however, by means of 
conventional set-theoretic and logical con­
cepts. In this regard, our approach to the 
study of the interplay of modal and pos­
sibilistic logics is different from approaches 
such as that used by Lakoff [5], who sought to 
generalize modal logics using fuzzy-set con­
cepts; or that of Dubois and Prade [2], who 
investigated modal structures with a view to 
the development of formal proof mechanisms 
in possibilistic logic. 
A major concept of semantic models of 
modal logic systems is a binary relation R, 
called the accessibility or conceivability re­
lation, which is assumed to have a number 
of properties intended to capture the seman­
tics of various qualifications of propositional 
truth. 
Our aim is to characterize the extent to 
which statements that are true in one situ­
ation or scenario may be said, perhaps with 
some suitable modification, to be true in an­
other state of affairs that resembles the first. 
We are particularly interested in describing 
more general (i.e., less specific) propositions 
that are true in one possible world as a func­
tion of the propositions that are true in an­
other. In order to model a continuous range 
of proximity between possible worlds, we will 
generalize the notion of accessibility relation 
to a full family of binary relations Ran in­
dexed by a numerical parameter a taking 
values between 0 and 1, along the same lines, 
albeit with a different purpose, as Lewis in 
his treatment of counterfactuals [4]. 
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3 Similarity Functions 
We will introduce a family of accessibility 
relations 
{Ra :a in [0, 1]}, 
by means of a binary function S, called the 
similarity relation, that maps pairs of pos­
sible worlds into numbers between 0 and 1. 
The multiple relations of accessibility Ra are 
defined in terms of this similarity function by 
wRaw' , whenever S(w, w') �a. 
The function S is intended to capture 
a notion of proximity, closeness, or resem­
blance between possible worlds, with a value 
of 1 corresponding to the identity of possi­
ble worlds and a value of 0 indicating that 
knowledge of propositions that are true in 
one possible world does not provide any in­
dication about propositions that are true in 
the other. To assure that the function S has 
the semantics of a relation that quantifies re­
semblance between possible states of affairs 
it is necessary to require that it satisfies a 
number of properties. 
Besides the above mentioned property 
that the similarity between a possible world 
and itself has the highest possible value, 
equivalent to stating that each accessibility 
relation Ra is reflexive, we will also require 
that the similarity between different possi­
ble worlds be strictly less than one. This 
requirement is intended to assure that the 
similarity relation may distinguish between 
different states of the possible world. 
The similarity relation will also be as­
sumed to be symmetric, and to satisfy a 
relaxed form of transitivity. Clearly, if the 
pairs of possible worlds ( w, w') and ( w', w") 
correspond to highly similar situations, it 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
would be surprising if w and w" were highly 
dissimilar. It is natural to assume, therefore, 
that 
S( w, w") � S( w, w') ® S( w', w") , 
where ®is a binary operator used to repre­
sent the lower bound for S( w, w") as a func­
tion of its arguments. This requirement is 
equivalent to the relaxed transitivity condi­
tion 
Ra@/3 � Ra oR/3, 
which replaces the usual, more stringent, 
definition of transitivity. 
Imposition of reasonable requirements 
upon the function ® shows that it has the 
properties of a triangular norm [9]. These 
functions, which play a significant role in 
multivalued logics [10], may be justified, 
therefore, purely on the basis of metric con­
siderations. Important examples of triangu­
lar norms are 
a ®b =min( a, b), a ®b =max( a+ b-1, 0 ), 
and 
a®b = ab, 
called the Zadeh, Lukasiewicz, and product 
triangular norms, respectively. 
The generalized transitivity property ex­
pressed by triangular norms clarifies their re­
lationship to the conventional mathematical 
concept of metric. If S is a similarity func­
tion, then the function 8 = 1 - S has the 
properties of a distance function. When ® 
corresponds to the Lukasiewicz norm, then 
the transitivity property of S corresponds to 
the well-known triangular property of dis­
tance functions. If ® correponds to the 
Zadeh triangular norm, then 8 may be shown 
to satisfy the more stringent ultrametric in­
equality. 
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4 Degrees of Implication and 
Consistence 
The classical derivation rule of modus po­
nens is easily interpreted in terms of subsets 
of possible worlds, since each proposition 
corresponds to one such set, while implica­
tion corresponds to the conventional relation 
of subset inclusion. In short, if three propo­
sitions p, q and r are equated with the corre­
sponding subsets of possible worlds, and if it 
is known that p is a subset of q (i.e., p ::::} q) 
and that q is a subset of r (i.e., q ::::} r ), then 
the modus ponens simply states that p is a 
subset of r (i.e., p => r ). 
While only two degrees of inclusion are 
recognized in two-valued logic, in that a set 
is either a subset of another set or it is 
not, the introduction of a similarity struc­
ture permits the definition of a graded no­
tion of inclusion. 
To illustrate the relationship between this 
new concept and generalized modal con­
cepts, we will extend first the classical def­
inition of the modal operator II in the fol­
lowing way: a proposition p will be said to 
be possible to the degree o in the possible 
world w (denoted w 1- II0p ) if there exists a 
world w' such that p is true in w' and such 
that S( w, w') � o. Furthermore, we will say 
that q necessarily implies, or is a necessary 
model of p to the degree o, if every q-world 
w is such that p is possible to the degree c:t 
. . 
m w, I.e., 
q => llaP· 
The definition of graded necessary impli­
cation generalizes the corresponding modal 
notion, by permitting us to express that q is 
a subset of a neighborhood, of specified size, 
of p. Since every possible world is similar, at 
least to the degree zero, to every other pos-
sible world, it is obvious that every subset of 
possible worlds implies every other subset to 
some degree a between 0 and 1. In simpler 
words, if p is stretched1 to the degree a, then 
this stretched set will include q. The upper 
bound of the values a such that q necessarily 
implies p to the degree o:, expressed by 
l(p I q) = inf sup S( w, w') , 
w'l-q wl-p 
provides a most useful measure of the min­
imal amount of stretching required to cover 
q with a neighborhood of p, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. The function I will be called the 
degree of implication. 
Figure 2: Degree of implication 
The degree of implication function pro­
vides the basis for the derivation of the gen­
eralized modus ponens of Zadeh [13]. This 
rule generalizes its classical counterparts by 
stating, in quantitative terms, the inclusion 
relations that hold between neighborhoods 
of three propositions, which is expressed by 
the transitive property of the degree of im­
plication function 
l(pjq) ;:::I(pjr)®l(rjq). 
This transitive property may also be ex­
pressed using modal operators in the form 
1 Recall that S is a similarity measure and that 
lower values of c:r correspond to higher values of 
stretching. 
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imply that 
q => Ila®PP· 
This simplest form of the generalized 
modus ponens, illustrated in Figure 3, tells 
us how much p should be stretched to en­
compass q on the basis of knowledge of the 
sizes of the neighborhoods of p that includes 
rand of r that includes q. 
Figure 3: The generalized modus ponens 
In addition to a function defining a de­
gree of implication, we will also need a dual 
notion, called the degree of consistence, to 
quantify the amount by which a set must be 
stretched in order to intersect another set. 
The degree of consistence of p and q is de­
fined by the expression 
C(p I q) =sup sup S(w, w') . 
w'l-q wl-p 
It is obvious from the definition that 
l(p I q) < C(p I q) . 
S Possibilistic Distributions 
The customary expression of the generalized 
modus ponens in fuzzy logic, which is more 
general than the simple transitive law of 
the degree of implication given above, is ex­
pressed by means of possibility and necessity 
distributions. As is the case with their prob­
abilistic counterparts, these functions may 
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be defined in both unconditioned and condi­
tional forms, corresponding, respectively, to 
descriptions of the proximity of the eviden­
tial set to other subsets of possible worlds 
with or without additional constraints. 
The unconditioned necessity of a set is de­
fined as any lower bound of the degree of im­
plication of p by if; thus N ec ( · ) is called an 
unconditioned necessity distribution for if if 
Nec(p) :5 I(p Ill). 
The corresponding concept of uncondi­
tioned possibility distribution is dually de­
fined as any upper bound for the degree of 
consistence of p and if, i.e., Poss ( ·) is called 
an unconditioned possibility distribution for 
if if 
Poss(p) � C(p Ill). 
This interpretation of necessity and pos­
sibility distributions readily leads to the 
derivation of a number of properties for these 
functions such as the basic laws, usually as­
sumed as axioms, linking the possibility and 
necessity of disjunctions with those of the 
disjuncts. 
To define conditional possibility and ne­
cessity distributions it is necessary to intro­
duce a form of inverse of the triangular norm. 
This function permits us to state the transi­
tive property of similarity relations by using 
an equivalent formulation of triangular in­
equalities, along the lines used in plane ge­
ometry to express the relation that exists be­
tween the three sides of a triangle, i.e., either 
(the length of) a side is smaller than the sum 
of the other two, or a side is larger than the 
difference of the other two. 
If ® is a triangular norm, its pseudoin­
verse 0 is the function, defined over pairs of 
numbers in the unit interval of the real line, 
287 
by the expression 
a 0 b =sup{ c: b ® c :5 a } . 
The following definitions make use of the 
inverse of triangular norms to characterize 
conditional possibility and necessity distri­
butions as measures of the proximity rela­
tions that exist between evidential worlds 
and those worlds satisfying a consequent 
proposition q as a proportion of the sim­
ilarity that exists between those eviden­
tial worlds and worlds that satisfy the an­
tecedent proposition p. 
Definition: A function Nec(·l·) is called a 
conditional necessity distribution for if if 
Nec(qlp) :5 inf [I(q I w) 0 I(p I w)] ., 
wl-� 
Definition: A function Poss(·l·) is called a 
conditional possibility distribution for if if 
Poss(qlp) �sup [I(q I w) 0 I(p I w) ]. 
wl-l" 
6 Generalized Modus Ponens 
The compositional rule of inference or gener­
alized modus ponens of of Zadeh [ 13] gener­
alizes the corresponding classical rule of in­
ference, permitting to infer statements even 
when a perfect match does not exist be­
tween the antecedent of a conditional rule 
and known facts, i.e., from 
p 
p --+ q 
q 
to its approximate version 
p' 
p --+ q 
q' 
where p' and q' are similar to p and q, re­
spectively. 
The generalized modus ponens may be 
viewed, therefore, as an extrapolation pro­
cedure that exploits the similarity between 
the known facts, or the evidence formalized 
as the evidential set, and a set of possible 
worlds or the antecedent proposition p, to­
gether with expressions relating the prox­
imity of p-worlds and q-worlds, to bound 
the similarity between evidential worlds and 
those that satisfy the consequent proposition 
q. 
The actual formal statement of the gener­
alized modus ponens makes use of the notion 
of partition of the universe of discourse. As 
a simple extension of the notion of disjoint 
partition of a set, a partition .!J" is simply de­
fined as a collection of mutually inconsistent 
propositions such that their disjunction is al­
ways true, or, equivalently, as a collection of 
disjoint subsets of possible worlds such that 
their union is the universe of discourse. In 
most applications of fuzzy set theory, parti­
tions follow naturally from the notion of vari­
able since every possible world corresponds 
to a unique value of a system variable. 
Using this concept, it is possible to state 
the following results that allow derivation 
of necessity and possibility distributions for 
a consequent proposition q, on the basis of 
approximate knowledge expressed by uncon­
ditioned distributions for antecedent propo­
sitions p in the partition .!J", and condi­
tional distributions relating these anteC:edent 
propositions with q. 
Theorem (Generalized Modus Ponens for 
Necessity Functions): Let .!1' be a partition 
and let q be a proposition. If Nec(p) and 
Nec(qlp) are real values, defined for every 
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proposition p in the partition .!i", such that 
Nec(p) < I(p I If), 
N ec ( q IP) < inf [I ( q I w) 0 I (p I w) ], wl-� 
then the following inequality is valid: 
sup [ Nec(qlp) ® Nec(p)] � I(q IS'). 
.!JI' 
Theorem (Generalized Modus Ponens for 
Possibility Functions): Let .!1' be a partition 
and let q be a proposition. IT Poss (p) and 
Poss(qjp) are real values, defined for every 
proposition p in .!J", such that 
Poss(p) > C(p l ff), 
Poss(qlp) > sup [I(q I w) 0 l(p I w)], 
wl-� 
then the following inequality is valid: 
sup [ Poss(qjp) ® Poss(p) J > C(q I if). 
.!JI' 
7 Conclusion 
This paper summarizes some aspects of a se­
mantic model of fuzzy logic that is rooted on 
notions of similarity or resemblance between 
conceivable states of the real world. These 
metric structures are conceptually and func­
tionally different from those that are used in 
probabilistic reasoning, which rely on mea­
sures of set extension. 
The essential difference between the aims 
and structures of probabilistic and possi­
bilistic formulations that is clarified by this 
model is readily understood when it is noted 
that being in a situation s does not make a 
similar situation s' more likely, or vice versa. 
Reality is described in one case by summary 
accounts of past experience and, in the other, 
by comparison with other states introduced 
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for referential purposes, regardless of their 
degree of historic ubiquity. 
The insight provided by this model makes 
clear that possibilistic notions describe situ­
ations known through imprecise, uncertain, 
and vague information in a way that neither 
replaces or is replaced but that, rather, com­
plements the views produced by other ap­
proaches. 
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